TACTICAL ANALYSIS: HOW FAR CAN UNITED GO?

Last Thursday, Kim McCauley published a newsletter in The Transfer Flow titled ‘Are Tottenham Hotspur Good?’ Early in the piece, Kim succinctly captures Tottenham’s strength with the phrase: “press machine go brrrr.”

Coming into the match Spurs had by far a league best 5.99 PPDA (per Statsbomb) with second place Brighton all the way back at 7.72. As Kim notes, “they’re also top of the league in StatsBomb’s aggression metric, which is defined as the proportion of opponent pass receipts that are pressured within 2 seconds.”

Not only are Spurs aggressive as hell, but as this Statsbomb graphic shows, they’re doing it really high up the pitch.

Had you not watched any of Spurs’ first five matches this season but simply just read the first few paragraphs of Kim’s article, you would know exactly what Spurs planned on doing when they rolled up Old Trafford.

Manchester United appeared completely unprepared for what was coming. Tottenham’s relentless press immediately caught them off guard, leaving United struggling to clear the ball from danger from the very start.

Every time they won the ball there was Tottenham closing them down and winning the ball straight back.

The first minute of this match was spent in Spurs end of the field after United went long on the kickoff and Spurs slowly played out the back. That makes it even more astonishing that this all happened within the first three minutes!

I’ve never seen Manchester United look less prepared for a game then they did on Sunday.

It would take 22 minutes for United to record their first shot of the match and by the time Bruno Fernandes was (harshly) sent off 41 minutes into the game, United were being outshot 12-3.

It’s performances like these that remind us there is a ceiling to how far Erik Ten Hag can take Manchester United. As Jonathan Wilson said in The Guardian, “If the first half performance against Tottenham on Sunday wasn’t the worst under Ten Hag, it’s only because there are so many other candidates.”

Over the last two plus years we’ve routinely seen United get tactically done in. It doesn’t just happen in away matches but at home too. In their first three games at Old Trafford this season United have been outscored 6-1.

That’s why we’re not going to talk about Sunday’s loss to Spurs. Instead, we’re going to talk about Thursday’s 1-1 draw against FC Twente in the Europa League because that match showed that even when things are going right there is a ceiling to how far Erik Ten Hag’s tactics can take you.

On Thursday night, United’s tactics worked. They were playing very well and you could see what they were trying to do. United were making the rotations Ten Hag wanted and the results were they were finding players in loads of space. Often dangerous spaces too.

It was a little slow at times. They did lack intensity. But the plan was working in that they wanted to get these players into these spaces. It’s just, as Tony Stark says in The Avengers, “not a great plan.”

United lacked any potentness. They failed to turn having the ball in dangerous spaces into a formidable attack. Thursday night United took 19 shots, but had an xG of just 1.5, a 0.07 xG per shot. United managed only three shots with an xG of 0.1 or better, two of which came from set pieces.

United’s best shot of the match came just over a half hour in from a sequence that is exactly what Erik Ten Hag has been trying to build for the past three years. In possession, Ten Hag has wanted that slow, slow, fast attack where United patiently pass the ball around before attacking with speed.

They get that here when Lisandro Martinez slips a pass to inverted left back Diogo Dalot, who has room to turn and run forward. Dalot eventually plays the ball out wide to Rashford who plays in a sharp low cross first time that, apparently, Joshua Zirkzee got a touch on worth 0.38 xG.

Herein lies the flaw with United’s tactical plan. Or rather two flaws.

The first is even when United start playing direct and can run at their opponents defense, United aren’t catching anyone out here. Twente have plenty of guys back to defend against this break. It’s United who are outnumbered.

The other issue is, who is getting the ball in dangerous spaces? Time and time again the answer is Diogo Dalot or Noussair Mazraoui, aka United’s fullbacks. That relegates United’s most dangerous players, Marcus Rashford, Alejandro Garnacho, Amad Diallo, to very wide touchline roles limiting how much impact they can make. When Rashford gets the ball from Dalot here, there’s a lot of ground he’s got to cover to get this ball to Zirkzee.

Late in the game, with United pushing to find a winner, Dalot is slightly off the touchline and slips a nice pass to a wide open Alejandro Garnacho.

Garnacho receives the ball and starts running towards the box. But his starting position is so far wide that before he can even get into the box, Twente have more than enough time to mosy on over and be ready to defend him.

Earlier in the half, United had a chance to break on the counter and extend their lead. Christian Eriksen slips the ball in to Joshua Zirkzee, who gets the opposition center back to step up out of the defensive line, where he then slips a pass behind to an attacker coming with speed. That attacker is left back Diogo Dalot, while Rashford, the man who thrives on counter attacks is forced to stay wide. Just look at how long it takes for Rashford to come into the frame.

United get a nice transition but it’s Dalot who’s in the key position running the break while Rashford is out holding the width.

By the time Dalot gives the ball to Rashford, there really isn’t much he can do with it here and it’s a wasted opportunity.

This summer United signed Dutch striker Joshua Zirkzee, presumably, because of his ability to drop a bit deeper and link up play. He can receive passes with his back to goal and play that false-9 role that opens up space for Rashford who has historically thrived when playing next to a false-9.

But you can only thrive with a false-9 if you play it correctly. The purpose of a false-9 is to have your striker drop deeper and force the center back to step out of his line to follow him.

If the centerback doesn’t do that, now you have a numerical advantage in midfield. When the centerback does follow the striker deeper, then your winger can go and attack the space vacated by the centerback.

You don’t need me to explain to you why Marcus Rashford thrives in this situation. But this version of Manchester United still insists on having Rashford (or Garnacho) maintain their width even after the centerback creates space for them.

Here’s a situation on Sunday. This time it’s Kobbie Mainoo in the middle of the park but he achieves the goal of getting Cristian Romero to step up and close him down, creating space in behind.

Rashford should be running in behind here but instead he’s tasked with holding width.

By the time Rashford gets the ball, Spurs have plenty of guys back to prevent him from getting to the middle.

Rashford is left with nothing to do but try a hopeful cross to Zirkzee.

it was always going to be difficult for Rashford to get in behind here as his starting position was so far wide, because that’s where he’s being told to stand. The key to playing a false 9 is for your wingers to be a bit more narrow so they could quickly take advantage of space and so short quick passes can reach them.

Back on Thursday United had a chance to break just after halftime. This time a long ball comes from Onana, and a centerback steps up to try and win it. Zirkzee does a first touch flick to an attacker allowing him to easily get behind the centerback.

Again that attacker is the left back Dalot. Again Rashford is painfully out wide and the ball never reaches him.

Time and time again United worked the ball into a dangerous areas only for the man on the ball to be Dalot.

This wasn’t just the theme of Thursday night, this has been the theme for the past two years.

The problem is Dalot is hardly good enough to hurt the opposition from these positions. Last season Dalot scored two goals and added three assists from 1.7 xG and 2.9 xA, nothing sensational. He’s a jack of all trades type of player who can do a job at left back and do a job inverting into central midfield during buildup.

He’s very good in the first and second phase of buildup play but that doesn’t mean you should suddenly be running your entire attack through him. It was fitting that United’s goal on Thursday came from a situation where Dalot once again found space in a very dangerous position.

Martinez makes a very nice pass to pick him out only for Dalot to take a horrific first touch and have it knocked away by a defender. Luckily for United, Christian Eriksen was there to smash it home.

This time it worked out for United, but so often Dalot gets on the ball in a position where there are four or five other players who you’d rather have on the ball in that spot. Meanwhile United’s dangerous players are shunted out wide.

This is a major reason why United’s attack has struggled the last two years. Their most dangerous men are out wide while the guys getting on the ball in dangerous are the players whom the opposition want to have the ball in those spaces.

This isn’t a problem that is fixed by Luke Shaw returning to full fitness. Shaw is also good in the first and second phase of buildup, but in the final third his strength is playing as an overlapping fullback out wide. Under this system United’s fullbacks playing in the half spaces rather than out wide is by design. Meanwhile the attackers struggles are only amplified by not having an overlapping fullback.

The past two games have put a spotlight on how low Manchester United’s ceiling is under Erik Ten Hag. Sunday showed us that United are always right around the corner from another match where everything goes horribly wrong. Thursday showed that even when the tactics work, they don’t utilize the strengths and talent that United have. As long as that’s what the plan is, United are going to under achieve. It’s supply not good enough.

2024-09-30T19:07:19Z dg43tfdfdgfd